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Insider Brief
- The United States and Europe need closer cooperation on quantum supply chains, infrastructure and standards to turn their research strengths into commercial capabilities, according to QED-C Deputy Director Jonathan Felbinger.
- Europe’s larger quantum workforce and greater number of quantum-focused companies complement U.S. strength in private investment, according to industry figures cited by Felbinger in the EE Times.
- Felbinger warned that fragmented allied markets could raise costs and slow adoption as China sustains substantial public investment in quantum technology.
National, state and regional efforts to build quantum industries often capture the headlines. But the strengths that reach across those borders may prove to be just as important to their success, according to a senior industry consortium official writes in EE Times .
According to Jonathan Felbinger, deputy director of the Quantum Economic Development Consortium , the United States and Europe risk weakening their quantum industries if they allow separate supply chains, standards and policies to divide allied markets. He advocates for closer transatlantic cooperation to turn scientific research into businesses capable of building, selling and supporting quantum technologies.
In the opinion piece, he said the two regions have complementary strengths but need stronger connections among investors, suppliers, research facilities and customers.
According to Felbinger, a gap between scientific capability and commercial development. Both regions have substantial research foundations but those assets alone will not determine which countries lead as quantum technologies become more closely tied to national security and economic competition.
“For the U.S. and Europe, quantum leadership requires more than a scientific base,” he writes “Both already have that foundation. The harder task is turning research strength into industrial strength before competitors set the terms of the market.”
Felbinger’s recommendations come with a caution about the industry’s maturity. Many quantum companies remain pre-commercial, broad profitability has yet to emerge, and some proposed applications may take longer to develop than supporters expect or may never materialize, he wrote.
Europe’s Workforce, America’s Capital
Figures Felbinger cited from QED-C ’s State of the Global Quantum Industry 2026 report show how the United States and European Union could complement each other.
The EU has 173 companies focused specifically on quantum technology, compared with 164 in the United States, according to the report. U.S. quantum companies raised more than $2.7 billion in venture capital in 2025, evidence of the country’s ability to attract private investment.
The workforce figures show a similar division with the EU employing 6,420 workers at quantum-focused companies, compared with 4,401 in the United States. U.S. quantum-related job openings nevertheless exceeded those in the EU in 2025, at 3,002 compared with 2,932, Felbinger writes.
Those differences support his case for connecting Europe’s company and workforce base with the depth of U.S. capital markets. Neither strength is sufficient by itself, Felbinger writes.
The industry’s staffing needs are also expanding beyond research with engineering representing the largest workforce category. Other operations account for 14% and business development for 13%, according to the article.
Felbinger indicates that the changing mix is evidence that companies increasingly need employees who can move technology into commercial use. Developing the underlying science remains necessary, but businesses also need people who can manufacture products, find customers, manage deployment and provide support.
Shared Suppliers and Facilities
Quantum systems already depend on capabilities spread across national borders, Felbinger writes. A single system may combine cooling equipment, light-based components, control electronics and software from several countries, for example.
That dependence makes coordination among suppliers a practical concern. Many specialized components come from small businesses or companies in related industries that may not yet view quantum technology as a major market, he points out.
Felbinger called for cooperation on shared infrastructure, including fabrication facilities and testbeds where developers and customers can evaluate early systems. Building such facilities separately could leave countries paying for expensive capacity that duplicates work elsewhere or attracts too little use.
A transatlantic approach could instead connect existing capabilities and improve access to the equipment companies need to develop and assess their products, he wrote.
Standards present another potential obstacle because quantum technologies will need to operate alongside existing computers, networks and security systems. Customers will also need understandable ways to compare performance.
Felbinger warns that incompatible U.S. and European approaches could increase costs and slow adoption. He acknowledged the reasons for European policies aimed at retaining control over critical technologies and U.S. restrictions intended to protect sensitive capabilities from strategic competitors. But he cautioned against allowing those policies to separate allied markets unnecessarily.
China can be positioned as a benchmark for the scale of coordinated investment, Felbinger writes.
According to the article, China had committed $15.3 billion in public quantum funding as of 2025, accounting for 27% of global commitments. It’s necessary to point out that although these are standard figures for China’s quantum investments, China’s investment figures are still debated among quantum ecosystem experts.
The article also indicates that China accounted for 54% of global quantum patents, with filings increasing 42% from 2024 to 2025. Felbinger cautions that patent totals are an imperfect measure of innovation. Even so, he presented the figures as evidence of sustained attention that raises the stakes for cooperation among allied countries.
His proposal does not require U.S. and European companies to stop competing or governments to abandon domestic priorities. Instead, he called for reducing unnecessary barriers that make allied markets more difficult to serve.
The longer-term challenge is sustaining investment while commercial evidence develops. With the value of many applications still uncertain, Felbinger writes that leadership will depend partly on whether countries can maintain support long enough to establish where quantum technologies meet actual demand.
Felbinger concludes: “For the U.S. and Europe, the opportunity to build these connections is still open, but not a guaranteed outcome. Quantum leadership will depend on whether allied markets can turn distributed strengths into shared capability and close the circuit that includes research, capital, infrastructure, and deployment.”